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LEVERAGE DYNAMICS AND LEARNING ABOUT ECONOMIC CRISES

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Economic / financial crises are characterized by

- large drops in prices of risky assets, associated with increases in risk premia
- persistent effects and slow recoveries


Learning mechanisms alone often have transitory effects

- elevated risk premia when uncertainty about state of the economy is high
- this uncertainty is resolved relatively quickly (once we learn we are in adverse state)

This paper: combination of learning about disasters and leverage effects

- 1) **Unobserved Markov state** determines intensity of disasters.
- 2) Investors observe an **increased frequency of disasters**.
 - increase the posterior probability of adverse (high-intensity) Markov state
 - price of risk is high when uncertainty about the state is high
- 3) Disasters also **depress firms' cash flows** and **increase their leverage**.
 - quantity of risk in the cash flows increases as distance-to-default shrinks
- 4) **Elevated risk premia** are driven
 - initially driven by an increase in risk prices
 - later by an increase in the quantity of cash-flow risk

Equity Index



- Perfect info. - unlevered
- Learning - unlevered
- Perfect info. - levered
- Learning - levered
- Data

Consumption process

$$\frac{dC_t}{C_t} = \mu_c dt + \sigma_c dB_{c,t} + \left(e^{-Z_{c,t}} - 1 \right) dN_t$$

- N has unobservable time-varying intensity λ_t , jump $Z_{c,t}$ exponentially distributed

Filtering: posterior probability of high-risk state

$$p_t = P(\lambda_t = \lambda_H | \mathcal{F}_t)$$

Recursive Duffie–Epstein–Zin preferences

$$J_t = \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \left[\int_t^\infty f(C_s, J_s) ds \right]$$

- unitary IES and risk aversion γ

The SDF takes the form

$$\frac{d\pi_t}{\pi_{t-}} = -r(p_{t-}) dt - \Theta_B dB_{c,t} + [\Theta_J(Z_{c,t}) + \Theta_L(p_{t-}, Z_{c,t})] dN_t - \left(\lambda^Q(p_{t-}) - \tilde{\lambda}(p_{t-}) \right) dt$$

- price of Brownian risk $\Theta_B = \gamma \sigma_c$
- price of jump risk $\Theta_J(Z_{c,t}) \approx \gamma Z_{c,t}$
- price of belief uncertainty (requires non-separable preferences)

$$\Theta_L(p_{t-}, Z_{c,t}) \approx -(\gamma - 1) \sigma_P(p_{t-}) V'(p_t) [1 + \Theta_J(Z_{c,t})]$$

Real earnings process for firm k

$$\frac{dX_{k,t}}{X_{k,t-}} = \mu_x dt + \sigma_x^{id} dB_{x,k,t} + \sigma_x^{sys} dB_{x,t} + \left(e^{-Z_{k,t}} - 1 \right) dN_t - dN_{k,t}$$

- systematic cash flow jump arrivals perfectly correlated with consumption jumps
- Brownian shock B_x correlated with B_c but pricing implications are trivial
- additional idiosyncratic jumps and Brownian shocks to fit cross-sectional distributions

Given fixed perpetual coupon c_k , the value of levered equity is

$$S_{k,t} = (1 - \eta) \sup_{\tau_{D,k} \geq t} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \left[\int_t^{\tau_{D,k}} \frac{\pi_u}{\pi_t} (X_{k,u} - c_k) du \right].$$

- optimal default stopping time $\tau_{D,k}$

Optimal coupon c_k determined at firm creation to maximize firm value net of debt issuance costs.

- optimal coupon decreasing in the probability of the high-risk state p_0 at firm creation
- optimal default threshold increasing in p_t

Exogenous firm destruction (and replacement) guarantees a stationary firm distribution.



The modeling part is conceptually straightforward.

- exogenous SDF for the pricing of heterogeneous levered cash flows


Emphasis on **empirical fit**.

- consumption process fits frequency and magnitude of disasters
- cash flow processes fit excess returns, leverage, CDX rates
- particular attention to physical default risk and its pricing




EXPERIMENT - GREAT DEPRESSION







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



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


EXPERIMENT - GREAT DEPRESSION



1) Dissecting the equity premium


- paper emphasizes careful modeling of evolution of crises
- **Beason and Schreindorfer (2022)** emphasize that most of the equity premium is generated by 'intermediate' disasters
- how does the model do here?



2) How persistent are risk premia in typical recessions / financial crises?

- In many episodes, increases in proxies for risk premia are more transitory (Meeuwis et al. (2024))

Figure A.1: Time-Varying Risk Premia in the Data



3) Should we expect this mechanism to fit all of the decline during Great Depression?

- effects of monetary policy, debt deflation?
- what else is missing?
- is the linear projection a good way how extend the CDX data to the Great Depression?
- why learning from consumption disasters (apart from the connection to the literature?)

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4) How to interpret the fit of the observed trajectory within an IRF 'fan chart'?

- the fan chart is **not** a confidence interval for the path in a meaningful sense

Well executed paper with a clear mechanism

- attention to careful calibration of firms' cash flows
- interesting (and ambitious) Great Depression experiment

Think about

- alternative ways how to assess the asset pricing implications
- how to isolate the learning-leverage mechanism from everything else that happened during the Great Depression

APPENDIX

Beason, Tyler and David Schreindorfer. 2022. "Dissecting the Equity Premium." *Journal of Political Economy* 130 (8):2203–2222.

Meeuwis, Maarten, Dimitris Papanikolaou, Jonathan Rothbaum, and Lawrence D. W. Schmidt. 2024. "Time-Varying Risk Premia and Heterogeneous Labor Market Dynamics."